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I. INTRODUCTION
It is useful at the outset to identify the roles
and contexts in which international law might assist in
controlling external threats to national parks and
other areas administered by the U.S. National Park
Service (hereinafter referred to jointly as "national
parks"). International law may serve two roles
regarding external threats: it may provide substantive
rules governing particular threats, and it may provide
procedural mechanisms or frameworks for resolving
disputes and making rules about external threats. See,
e.2., Bilder, International Law and Natural Resource
Policies, 20 Nat. Res. J. 451, 480-84 (1980).
With respect to contexts, international law might
be helpful in two different types of situations.
First, international law in the form of treaties may
impose obligations on the United States relevant to
domestic threats, by which I mean external threats to a
national park originating in the United States. An
example would be if a domestic threat endangered a
breeding habitat located in a national park of a bird
species that the United States was obligated to protect
pursuant to a treaty concerning migratory birds. Cf.
Coggins & Russell, Beyond Shooting Snail Darters in
Pork Barrels: Endangered Species and Land Use in
America, 70 Geo. L.J. 1433, 1445-48 (1982).
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Second, international law in the form of treaties
or customary international law may provide some protection vis-a-vis international threats, by which I mean
threats to a national park that originate outside the
United States. Some national parks adjoin a U.S.
border with another nation and are threatened by sources in that nation. Glacier National Park, which is
threatened by water pollution from the proposed Cabin
Creek coal mine in British Columbia, Canada, is one
example. See, e.2., National Park Service, State of
the Parks -- 1980: A Report to the Congress, 48-49
[hereinafter cited as State of the Parks Report]:
Keiter, On Protecting the National Parks from the
External Threats Dilemma, 20 Land & Water L. Rev. 355,
361-69 (1985); Wilson, Cabin Creek and International
Law -- An Overview, 5 Pub. Land L. Rev. 110 (1984).
Eighteen national parks (as defined above) are adjacent
to U.S. borders with Canada and Mexico and thus may be
so affected: the State of the Parks Report (at 52-57)
identifies 317 threats to those national parks,
although it is not clear how many are international
threats.
A larger number of national parks are not on a
U.S. border but nevertheless face threats emanating
from foreign sources. Rocky Mountain National Park,
which could be threatened by air pollution from a
copper smelter in Mexico, and the national parks in
Alaska, which are threatened by air pollution origi- 2-

nating in northern nations such as the U.S.S.R., typify
this sub-category of international threats. See, e.2.,
Cong. Research Serv., Library Cong., The Nacozari,
Mexico, Copper Smelter: Air Pollution Impacts on the
U.S. Southwest (1985); Magraw, The International Law
Commission's Study of International Liabilit y for
Nonprohibited Acts as it Relates to Developing
Countries, 26 Wash. L. Rev.

(1986).

The set of international threats is particularly
ominous. International threats are likely to intensify, as the world industrializes, as the demands on
the world's resources increase, and as the global ecosystem's ability to assimilate the various demands
placed on it is exceeded. See, e.g.., R. Falk, This
Endangered Planet (1971); J. Schneider, World Public
Order of the Environment (1979); I. van Lier, Acid Rain
and International Law (1980). In addition, the nation
in which a threatening activity occurs does not
experience the transboundary damage caused by the activity and thus is unlikely of its own accord to regulate
adequately that activity. (This dilemma involves what
economists refer to as an "externality." See generally
F. Kirgis, Jr., Prior Consultation in International Law
1-2 (1983)). Furtherj the activities giving rise to
international threats cannot, by definition, be regulated by the United States unilaterally.
Solutions thus must be international. Some can be
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bilateral, e.g., with respect to the threat confronting
Glacier National Park alluded to already. But many
must be regional or even global in breadth.
The need for multinational cooperation and regulation poses differing degrees of difficulty, depending,
inter alia, on the number of foreign sources of a particular threat and on the United States' relations with
the nations in which those sources are located.
External threats that emanate from a combination of
domestic and foreign threats pose particularly sensitive questions, especially when neither the domestic
nor the foreign component is objectionable standing
alone. Similarly, external threats sourced in, or
influenced by the participation of, more than one
foreign nation present difficult issues.
Part II of the presentation that follows summarizes the characteristics of the international-law
system and the practical implications flowing
therefrom. Part III examines specific sources of
international law that may already provide some protection against international threats to national parks.
In summary, a growing body of international practice
exists that is evolving to -- and may already have
formed, in particular instances -- customary international law with respect to transboundary harm, even
where the activities giving rise to the harm are not
unlawful in any way. At present, except possibly with
respect to the United States' immediate neighbors, that
-4-

body of law does not offer much assistance in terms of
international threats to national parks. Customary
international law regarding international watercourses
may require prior consultation and good-faith negotiation about international threats involving international rivers or bays, but it is doubtful that that
custom provides much assistance beyond that, at least
at the present time. It is also possible that regional
customary law exists between Canada and the United
States and between Mexico and the United States that
might apply to international threats, although in the
case of the United States and Mexico, such law might
not be helpful. There exist a set of treaties -- and
possibly some customary international law -- concerning
pollution at sea that might be relevant to national
parks threatened by pollution from the high seas. In
addition, the United States has bilateral agreements
with Canada and Mexico that may either protect a specific park or provide a framework for negotiations
regarding international threats. More generally, the
long experience of the international legal system in
negotiating treaties and resolving disputes offers some
guidance in dealing with international threats.
Furthermore, a handful of national parks are World
Heritage sites or international biosphere reserves, and
those programs may offer some protection, either
directly or indirectly.
Part IV discusses the possibility that inter-5-

national law may impose obligations on the United
States with respect to domestic threats, i.e., threats
to national parks arising within the United States.
Three final points should be mentioned to provide
analytic perspective. First, it is important to
recognize that just as activities in other nations can
endanger U.S. national parks, so activities in the
United States and U.S. undertakings outside the United
States can threaten other nations' protected areas.
For example, activities in Alaska reportedly threaten
Canadian parks. Quite apart from the issues of whether
the United States is obligated by international law
(cf. Convention Concerning the Protection of the World
Cultural and Natural Heritage, art. 6.3, Nov. 16, 1972,
27 U.S.T. 37, T.I.A.S. No. 8226) or U.S. law (cf. 16
U.S.C.

470a-2) to prevent or mitigate such threats,

that fact obviously affects international negotiations
regarding threats to national parks (and to other U.S.
resources). Second, this presentation focuses on areas
administered by the National Park Service, but much of
the international law discussed herein would also apply
to other protected areas within the United States.
Third, my research is at an early stage regarding
several of the issues addressed herein; my conclusions
thus are tentative and preliminary in nature.
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II. THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. Nature of the International Legal System
The international legal system differs significantly from the U.S. legal system, and from other
national legal systems, in at least three ways. First,
there is no centralized law-making authority, such as
the U.S. Congress. Partly as a result of the absence
of such an authority, the sources of international law
differ from the sources of domestic law, and it is
often difficult to determine whether an internationallaw norm exists regarding a given topic, such as international threats to national parks, as is described
below. Second, the international legal system does not
have any centralized adjudicative body authorized to
determine whether international law has been violated.
Third, the international legal system does not contain
an effective centralized enforcement mechanism, such as
a national army or police force.
In spite of the characteristics just described,
international law, especially in the form of treaties,
usually is followed. Behavior conforming to international law is particularly likely to occur in relations between nations with a common border -- such as
the United States and Canada or the United States and
Mexico -- because of the long-term implications of that
geographical proximity. Nevertheless, there are
numerous instances where international law has not been
adhered to and where the existence of international law
-7-

has not protected the interests that the law was
intended to protect. Generally speaking, the incidence
of international unlawfulness increases as the core
national interests -- and especially national-security
interests -- of the lawbreaker are approached more
closely. The primary point to keep in mind for present
purposes is that, although the existence of an international norm does not guarantee compliance with that
norm in the international arena, agreed-upon and
clearly defined norms relating to threats to national
parks would most likely be adhered to, especially among
Canada, Mexico, and the United States.
In the domestic arena of the United States, it is
accepted doctrine that international law is part of the
law of the land and thus that the United States can be
forced, via the court system, to comply with international law. See, e.q., The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S.
677 (1900). That statement, however, is subject to a
number of serious limitations. Perhaps the most significant is that under U.S. law, the doctrine of laterin-time prevails, so that, for example, a properly
enacted federal statute supersedes a prior treaty that
otherwise would be binding, even where the statute
contradicts the United States' obligations under the
treaty. Similarly, courts are subject to doctrines
such as the political-question doctrine, see Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), which can result in a
court's refusing to exercise its jurisdiction.
-8-

Assuming, however, that no such doctrine applied and
that no subsequent conflicting legislation had been
enacted, the United States could be forced to comply
with its treaty obligations regarding protecting
national parks, even if it were otherwise inclined not
to do so.
B. Sources of International Law
There are two primary sources of international
law: international agreements (variously referred to
by terms such as treaties, conventions, etc.) and
customary international law. International agreements
are typically easily identifiable. Major difficulties
concern interpteting the agreements, which is often
complicated by the existence of official versions in
two or more different languages and imprecise drafting,
and the question of whether the agreement requires
implementing legislation in order to be effective. The
latter question is referred to as whether the agreement
is "self-executing." If the agreement is non-selfexecuting, it will not be effective as domestic law
within the United States unless implementing legislation is passed. See, e.g. ., Iwasawa, The Doctrine of
Self-Executing Treaties in the United States: A
Critical Analysis, 26 Va. J. Int'l L. 627 (1986); ALI,
Restatement Foreign Relations Law of the United States
(Revised) (Tent. Final Draft, July 15, 1985, Vol. I),
§ 131.
Determining whether a rule of customary inter-9-

national law exists is a more difficult task. The test
is whether there has been a general, consistent, and
representative practice of nations taken or done under
the belief that such practice was required (or, in some
instances, permitted) by international law. See, e.g.,
id. at S 102(2). That inquiry is complex, and the
standards that have been applied are less than crystalclear. The situation is complicated by the possibility
that a rule of special custom or regional custom between two or more nations may exist even if a worldwide
rule of customary international law on the same topic
does not. Finally, a customary international law norm
does not bind a nation that has persistently and
notoriously objected to the norm.
At least according to Article 38 of the Statute of
the International Court of Justice ("ICJ"), there is a
third source of international law: "the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations." See
id. at § 102(4). That source has rarely been used, but
it might be significant for present purposes.
As indicated by Article 38 of the ICJ's Statute,
judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly
qualified publicists of the various nations are "subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law,"
although they are not, strictly speaking, sources of
law themselves. Thus, for example, the 1941 Trail
Smelter award holding Canada liable under international
law for lawful transboundary pollution in the United
-10-

States did not create a rule of international accountability in such circumstances, but it does serve as
evidence that such a rule exists. See Trail Smelter
(U.S. v. Can.), 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1905 (1938 &
1941).
The final point to be made with respect to the
sources of law is that the existence of the United
Nations General Assembly and the practice of the
General Assembly to pass resolutions (and declarations)
have raised a significant controversy with respect to
the effect of such resolutions. It seems clear that a
unanimous General Assembly resolution that states that
it embodies international law will be given great
weight, and perhaps conclusive weight, in establishing
that an international-law norm does in fact exist.
Resolutions that do not contain such a statement or
that are not unanimous raise more difficult questions,
with respect to which commentators differ widely.
Actions or declarations by other parts or agencies of
the United Nations or by other international organizations are less persuasive as sources of international
law than are General Assembly resolutions. Thus, for
example, statements by UNESCO (the United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization)
regarding the meaning of the Biosphere Reserve Program
or the World Heritage Convention do not, by themselves,
constitute international law.

C. Selected References
1.

M. Akehurst, A Modern Introduction to

International Law (4th ed. 1982);

2.

I. Brownlie, Principles of International Law

(3rd ed. 1979);
3.

L. Oppenheim, International Law -- A Treatise

(Vol. I - Peace, H. Lauterpacht, ed., 8th ed. 1955;
Vol. II - Diputes, War and Neutrality, H. Lauterpacht,
ed., 7th ed. 1952);
4.

L. Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the

Constitution (1972).
III. INTERNATIONAL THREATS TO NATIONAL PARKS
In analyzing this topic, it is critical to
recognize that international threats can arise from
both lawful and unlawful acts. If the international
threat involves an act by a foreign nation that is
unlawful under international law, that nation will be
required to make reparations. Such reparations might
take three forms: restitution of the status quo;
satisfaction, i.e., an apology by the offending nation;
and monetary payments. None of those three forms are
particularly helpful regarding many forms of damage to
national parks. For example, it may be impossible to
quantify in monetary terms aesthetic damage. Similarly,
a mere apology will not suffice. Finally, restitution
may not be possible for damage to an ecological system.
The emphasis thus should be on preventing harm before
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it occurs, not in trying to undo or compensate for
harm.
Putting aside the question of the form of reparations, it is obvious that a wide variety of
international-law rules defining lawfulness are potentially relevant to the international-threats question.
Many such violations are unlikely, and the interest
violated would not concern parks 21E se. For example,
Mexico might invade the United States via Big Bend
National Park and thus violate the international-law
norm against aggression. In the following discussion,
I focus on those norms that are most likely to be relevant to national parks qua parks.
If behavior is lawful but nevertheless harms or
threatens to harm a national park, it is still possible
that the acting foreign nation may be accountable under
international law. The rules are in flux, so great
certainty is not possible; I describe below what
appears to be evolving. The closest analogy under U.S.
domestic law is strict liability. If lawful activity
does give rise to transboundary harm, separate rules
for liability may apply, as is discussed in Part
III.C.2, below. Perhaps confusingly, if those rules
are violated, an international wrong occurs, and the
analysis may revert to the reparations rules already
described. See id.
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A. Multilateral Treaties (i.e., treaties to which
three or more nations are parties)
1.

There is no multilateral treaty pertaining to

all national parks per se. Other multilateral treaties
or multilateral cooperative arrangements, described
below, may provide some protection, however.
2.

World Heritage Convention
The Convention Concerning the Protection of

the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, Nov. 16, 1972,
27 U.S.T. 37, T.I.A.S. No. 8226 [hereinafter cited as
the World Heritage Convention], which entered into
force on December 17, 1975, provides some protection
for cultural heritage (including monuments, buildings,
and sites) and natural heritage (including biological,
geological and physiographical formations and natural
areas of "outstanding universal value from the point of
view of science, conservation or natural beauty"). Id.
at art. 1 & 2. Canada and the United States are parties to the Convention; Mexico is not.
A number of national parks are designated as World
Heritage sites on the World Heritage List (see id. art.
11), including Yellowstone National Park. Glacier
National Park has been nominated as a World Heritage
site by the U.S. government, but it has not yet been
approved for such status by the international body
authorized to maintain the World Heritage List.
Moreover, such designation probably will not be
approved on the international level unless Canada joins
-14-

in the application, which it appears reluctant to do in
part because of the current controversy about the Cabin
Creek coal mine.
The meaning and legal effect of the World Heritage
Convention are not entirely clear. The only case to
analyze the Convention is an Australian case, Australia
v. Tasmania, 57 Austral. L.J. Rep. 450 (1983). The
World Heritage Convention appears to be self-executing,
based on my preliminary research (the Tasmania case did
not address that question because under Australian law,
treaties cannot be self-executing), and thus would be
applicable for U.S. domestic-law purposes without the
need for implementing legislation. That result is far
from certain, however. See the 1981 Dep't of Interior
memorandum, discussed in part IV, infra. The Secretary
of the Interior has been designated to direct and coordinate U.S. participation in the Convention, 16 U.S.C.
S 470a-1, and the Secretary has issued rules setting
forth policies and procedures in that regard, 36 C.F.R.
Part 73 (1985).
As is discussed in greater detail in Part IV,
below, Articles 4 and 5 appear to place obligations for
protecting cultural and natural heritage sites on the
nation in which those sites are located. In addition,
Article 6.2 imposes an obligation on parties to the
Convention ("The . . . Parties undertake") to aid in
"the identification, protection, conservation and preservation of the cultural and natural heritage" iden-15-

tified in the World Heritage List if the nation in
which the site is located so requests. The extent of
that obligation is not clear from the face of the
Convention, and research has revealed no source that
analyzes that question. Nevertheless, Article 6.2
appears to offer protection of some sort to national
parks that are on the World Heritage List.
Article 6.3 of the Convention imposes an obligation on parties "not to take any deliberate measures
which might damage directly or indirectly the cultural
and natural heritage referred to in Articles 1 and 2
situated on the territory of other" parties to the
Convention. The meaning of Article 6.3 is subject to
debate. The important term "damage directly or
indirectly" is capable of widely differing interpretations. Also, Article 6.3 appears to apply regardless
of whether the heritage site has been placed on the
World Heritage List, an interpretation that is supported by the structure of the Convention as a whole
and by several opinions in the Tasmania case. If that
interpretation is correct, Canada may be obligated to
prevent British Columbian approval of the Cabin Creek
coal mine. The constitutional powers of the Canadian
provinces complicate the analysis, however. Article 34
of the Convention provides that if the federal government has the authority to prevent the prohibitive
action, it must do so; but if the federal government
does not have that authority, the federal government is
-16-

obligated only to inform the competent authorities at
the provincial level with its recommendation for their
adoption. I am not informed regarding which alternative applies to the Cabin Creek situation. See
generally Lucas, Acid Rain: The Canadian Position, 32
Kan. L. Rev. 165, 171-75 (1983).
3. Man and the Biosphere Program
The Man and the Biosphere Program operates under
the auspices of UNESCO. Perhaps the primary component
of that program is the biosphere reserve project. That
project began in the early 1970's and is not based on
an international agreement

per

se. See UNESCO, Action

plan for biosphere reserves, 20 Nature

Resources

(Oct.-Dec. 1984). Each participating country, of which
there are now 104, voluntarily establishes its own
national autonomous committee. The activities of those
committees are coordinated to some degree by UNESCO,
but UNESCO does not control their operations. Two
hundred fifty-two biosphere reserve sites now exist in
66 nations.
The United States, which continues to participate
in the Man and the Biosphere program even though it has
withdrawn from membership in UNESCO, has designated
twelve national parks as Biosphere Reserves, including
Glacier National Park. The State of the Parks Report,
suRra, at 19, identifies 386 reported threats to those
twelve, although it is not clear how many are international threats. Preliminary research has not
-17-

revealed any basis for concluding that the biosphere
reserve project creates binding legal obligations for
the participating nations with respect to biosphere
reserves in other nations. Recently proposed legislation would direct the Secretary of the Interior to give
priority attention to biosphere reserves. See S. 2092,
132 Cong. Rec. S 1561 (Feb. 25, 1986).
4. Law of the Sea
The recently negotiated Law of the Sea Convention
(1982), prohibits marine pollution under certain circumstances. Such pollution could eventually pollute
national parks and thus would be an unlawful activity
-- as defined in the Convention -- giving rise to an
international threat. The United States is not party
to the Convention (which is not yet in force) and has
declared that it will not be a party. Thus the United
States may not be able to take advantage of the treaty.
However, I think it likely that the United States eventually will find it prudent to become a party.
Moreover, the Reagan Administration has taken the position that the Convention embodies customary international law except with respect to the deep-seabedmining provisions. To the extent that argument is
correct, the United States would have the advantage of
the relevant rules contained in the Convention even
though it is not a party.
A variety of multinational conventions regarding
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marine oil pollution and waste disposal also exist that
might be relevant to obtaining compensation for waterborne oil pollution to national parks. See e.g.,
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution
of the Sea by Oil, May 12, 1954, 12 U.S.T. 2989,
T.I.A.S. No. 4900, 327 U.N.T.S. 3; Convention on the
Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Waste and
Other Matter, Dec. 29, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 2403, T.I.A.S.
No. 8165; cf. International Convention on Civil
Liability for Oil Pollution Damages, Nov. 29, 1969, 973
U.N.T.S. 3 (United States not a party); International
Convention on the Establishment of an International
Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, Dec.
18, 1971, 1978 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 95 (Cond. 7383),
U.N.T.S.

(United States not a party).

There is also a convention possibly relevant to nuclear
pollution. See Convention Relating To Civil Liability
in the Field of Maritime Carriage of Nuclear Material,
Dec. 17, 1971, 974 U.N.T.S. 255 (United States not a
party); cf. Convention on the Liability of Operators of
Nuclear Ships, May 25, 1962 (not yet in force),
reprinted in 57 Am. J. Int'l L. 268 (1963). For a
discussion of the recent negotiations to revise the
oil-pollution conventions and to develop a new compensation regime for ocean-pollution incidents involving
hazardous and noxious substances, see Comment, Dead in
the Water: International Law, Diplomacy, and
Compensation for Chemical Pollution at Sea, 26 Va. J.
-19-

Int'l L. 485 (1986).
B. Bilateral Treaties
1. Park-specific treaties
My research thus far has not revealed any binding
international agreements that specifically apply to
individual national parks. Such agreements might
exist, however, with respect to parks such as the
Glacier National Park, which is part of an international peace park with Canada's Waterton Park. Cf.
Pub. L. No. 72-116, May 2, 1932. Such an agreement
might have been entered into in the 1930's when the
international peace park was formed or when the two
parks were designated as biosphere reserves; inquiries
and research thus far have not uncovered any such
agreement, however. Other national parks (as defined
herein) that might be protected by such an agreement
include the San Juan Island National Historical Park,
the Roosevelt Campobello International Park (which is
administered jointly by the Canadian and U.S. National
Park Services and is located in Canada), the Rio Grande
Wild and Scenic River, the Amistad National Recreation
Area, and the Chamizal National Memorial. If an international agreement exists with respect to such a park,
it might impose obligations regarding protecting that
area that could be used with respect to an international threat.

-20-

2. United States-Canada boundary area agreements
In 1909, the United States and Great Britain (on
behalf of Canada) entered into the Boundary Waters
Treaty, Jan. 11, 1909, United States-Great Britain, 36
Stat. 2448, T.S. No. 548, which establishes certain
obligations with respect to boundary waters and also
provides a mechanism -- the International Joint
Commission ("IJC") -- for helping resolve boundarywater disputes. Notably, article IV of the Treaty provides: "It is further agreed that the waters herein
defined as boundary waters and waters flowing across
the boundary shall not be polluted on either side to
the injury of health or property on the other." That
language, which is (probably unrealistically) absolute
and unyielding on its face, is nowhere in the Treaty
defined more precisely, and research has not disclosed
any detailed analysis of such terms as "polluted,"
"injury," "health," or "property." Accord Arbitblit, 8
Ecology L.Q. 339, 348-49 (1979). The force of article
IV may be reduced considerably by the inclusion of a
provision akin to the "Harmon Doctrine" -- i.e., that a
nation has the unqualified sovereign right to utilize
and dispose of the waters of an international river
flowing through its territory -- in article II of the
Convention.
The fact that Glacier National Park is a biosphere
reserve may affect the application of article IV, on
the theory that the term "property" includes that
-21-

biosphere-reserve status. According to that argument,
any interference with biosphere-reserve goals or uses
would constitute an injury to property within the
meaning of article IV and thus would constitute a
violation of the Boundary Waters Treaty.
The IJC, which is composed of three members from
each nation, is a quasi-judicial body with mandatory
jurisdiction and binding authority to approve or
disapprove projects such as boundary-water diversions
or obstructions. See J. Carroll, Environmental
Diplomacy: An Examination and A Perspective of
Canadian-U.S. Transboundary Environmental Relations 47
(1983). In addition, article IX of the Boundary Waters
Treaty provides that either or both nations may refer
matters to the IJC for its nonbinding recommendation.
Such references tend to be handled in an ad hoc
fashion, often involving (as in the case of the Cabin
Creek controversy) a joint investigative board with the
directive to conduct scientific studies. The recommendations have not always been followed strictly.
Article X of the treaty permits both parties to refer a
dispute to the IJC for a binding decision, but that has
never been done.

See Wilson, Cabin Creek and

International Law -- An Overview, 5 Pub. Land L. Rev.
110, 118 (1984); Comment, Who'll Stop the Rain:
Resolution Mechanisms for U.S.-Canadian Transboundary
Pollution Disputes, 12 Den. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 51,
69-70 (1982).
-22-

The United States and Canada also entered into the
Agreement Between the United States of America and
Canada on Great Lakes Water Quality, April 15, 1972, 23
U.S.T. 301, T.I.A.S. No. 7312, which was based on a
report of the IJC. See J. Barros & D. Johnston, The
International Law of Pollution 71 (1974). See
generally Seminar Papers -- Great Lakes Legal Seminar:
Diversion and Consumptive Use, 18 Case W. Res. J. Int'l
L. 1 (1986). A more detailed supplemental agreement,
specifying measures for achieving water-quality objectives, was entered into in 1978. See Agreement
Between the United States and Canada on Great Lakes
Water Quality, reprinted in Int'l Envt'l

Eta. p.

31,

0601. Those Agreements may provide protection
regarding water quality of national parks located in or
adjacent to the Great Lakes system.
3. United States-Mexico boundary area agreements
Mexico and the United States entered into an executive agreement in 1983 that provides a framework for
negotiations to establish air-pollution regulatory
standards in the hundred kilometers on either side of
the border. See Agreement Between the United States of
America and the United Mexican States on Cooperation
for Protection and Improvement of the Environment in
the Border Area, 19 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1137 (Aug.
14, 1983) [hereinafter cited as the Environmental
Agreement]. Article 2 of that Agreement provides:

-23-

The Parties undertake, to the fullest extent
practical, to adopt the appropriate measures to
prevent, reduce and eliminate sources of pollution
in their respective territory which affect the
border area of the other.
Additionally, the Parties shall cooperate in
the solution of the environmental problems of
mutual concern in the border area, in accordance
with the provisions of this Agreement.
For a discussion of that Agreement, see Note, The
Environmental Cooperation Agreement Between Mexico and
the United States: A Response to the Pollution Problems
of the Borderlands, 19 Cornell Int'l L. J. 87 (1986).
Negotiations under the Environmental Agreement resulted
in another, but apparently nonbinding, agreement, dated
July 19, 1985, to control emissions from the recently
opened smelter in Nacozari, Mexico, and from the
smelter in Douglas, Arizona, each of which pollutes
the other country. The 1983 Environmental Agreement
might also prove useful with respect to any international threats involving air pollution in the border
area, e.g., to South Bend National Park, and possibly
other types of international threats, such as the
threat from Mexico's use of DDT, which is reportedly
affecting animal species in the United States. See
State of the Parks Report, supra, at 21.
The 1944 Treaty Relating to the Utilization of
Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio
Grande, Feb. 3, 1944, 59 Stat. 1219, T.S. No. 994, 3
U.N.T.S. 313, established the International Boundary
and Water Commission ("IBWC") (replacing the old
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International Boundary Commission, created in 1889 to
settle boundary demarcation disputes) to plan, build
and manage border water works to enter into further
agreements regarding international waters, and to
settle disputes regarding interpretation of the
Agreement if both parties consent. The IBWC might provide a forum for investigating international threats to
national parks, though it has not been so used thus
far, to my knowledge.
4. Other
The United States has bilateral "environmental
cooperation" treaties with the Soviet Union (1972),
West Germany (1974), Japan (1975), Panama (1979),
France (1984), and the Netherlands (1985). U.S. Dep't
of State, Office of the Legal Advisor, Treaties in
Force (1986). Those treaties might provide assistance
with respect to particular international threats,
although I have not had the opportunity to investigate
that possibility in detail. Treaties regarding migratory wildlife and fish might also provide some protection.
C. General Customary International Law
1. Protected areas generally
There does not appear to be any general customary
international law regarding protected areas
would provide protection to national parks.
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2. Transboundary harm generally
There is a substantial body of state practice that
has led some commentators to conclude that there exists
general customary international law with respect to
transboundary harm for lawful activities, i.e., that a
nation may be held liable for lawful activities in its
territory that cause injury in or to the territory of
another nation. An excellent study of the relevant
state practice has been conducted by the Secretariat of
the United Nations General Assembly. See Survey of
State Practice Relevant to International Liability for
Injurious Consequences Arising Out of Acts Not
Prohibited

by.

International Law (prepared by U.N.

Secretariat), UN Doc. ST/LEG/15 (1984). In summary,
that state practice consists of a wide variety of
treaties (including many of the treaties alluded to
above) and is supported by arbitral decisions such as
the Trail Smelter award, supra, and the L221 Lanoux
award, Laq Lanoux (Fr. v. Spain), 12 R. Int'l Arb.
Awards 281 (1957) (French), 24 I.L.R. 101 (1957)
(English), court decisions such as the Corfu Channel
case, Corfu Channel (UK v. Alb.), merits, 1949 ICJ Rep.

4 (judgment of Apr. 9), and United Nations declarations
such as the 1972 Stocxholm Declaration on the Human
Environment (particularly Articles 21, 22 and 23),
Reports of the United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment, Stockholm, 5-16 June 1972, pt. 1, ch. I
(UN Pub. Sales No. E73.II.A.14), reprinted in 11 I.L.M.
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1416 (1972).
The International Law Commission of the United
Nations is currently engaged in attempting to develop
rules regarding transboundary harm. For a detailed
description of that work, see Magraw, Transboundary
Harm: The International Law Commission's Study of
"International Liability," 80 Am. J. Int'l L. 305
(1986). In summary, the Commission's approach is based
on the general principle sic utere tuo ut alienum non
laedas, i.e., the duty to exercise one's rights in ways
that do not harm the interests of other subjects of
law. That principle imposes a duty on a nation to
exercise its rights in a manner that does not unreasonably harm the interest of other nations. That duty
potentially conflicts with the principle of international law that a nation has a sovereign right to be
free to engage in activities within its own territory
and with respect to its own nationals. The Commission
has thus attempted to allow as much freedom of choice
to nations as is compatible with adequately protecting
the interests of other nations.
The Commission's approach thus far has been to
propose rules that encourage establishing conventional
(treaty) regimes to deal with specific transboundaryinjury situations and that assert, in the absence of
such a regime, a fourfold duty to prevent, inform,
negotiate, and repair. The duty to prevent requires
the acting (or source) nation to take "measures of pre-27-

vention that as far as possible avoid a risk of loss or
injury" to other nations. The duty to inform requires
an acting nation to provide the affected nation with
all relevant and available information when an activity
occurring within the acting nation's territory or
control gives or may give rise to harm to the affected
nation. The duty to negotiate requires, under certain
circumstances, the acting and affected nations to enter
into negotiations regarding the necessity and form of a
conventional regime to deal with the situation, taking
into account a variety of enumerated criteria. If a
conventional regime is not arrived at and if injury
occurs, the duty to repair requires the nations to
negotiate in good faith to determine the rights and
obligations of the nations with respect to the injury.
Reparations shall be made unless such reparations are
not in accordance with the "shared expectations" of the
nations involved. Reparations are to be determined
according to a balance-of-interest test, taking into
consideration the shared expectations of the nations,
the enumerated criteria referred to above, and the
nations' actions with respect to the duties to prevent,
inform and negotiate. The duty to make reparations
thus is not the same as a rule of strict liability, but
it approaches, and may be identical to, strict liability if the harm is unpredictable or if the harm is
predictable and the acting nation completely ignores
the first three duties.
-28-

The ultimate failure to make the required reparations in the event of harm is a wrongful act. Only at
this point, therefore, has a nation committed an act
prohibited by international law.
The concept of "shared expectations" in the
Commission's approach seems closely related to the
notion of regional customary international law.
Consideration of the shared expectations of the United
States and Canada and the United States and Mexico,
respectively, thus would presumably be affected by the
same types of factors relevant to determining whether a
norm of regional customary international law exists
between those two sets of countries, as is discussed in
Part 111.0, below.
The scope of international liability, i.e., under
what circumstances does the fourfold duty apply, has
been the subject of ongoing debate. One aspect that
remains largely unanswered is what constitutes transboundary harm. This aspect is particularly important
because international liability potentially extends to
the large universe of lawful activities and because so
many such activities have effects of some kind in other
nations. A second aspect concerns the degree to which
nations are to be accountable for the activities of private persons. Thus far, it seems that nations are to
be accountable for virtually all private activities
within their territory or control. A third critical

-29-

aspect concerns what type of activities are to be
covered (assuming there is transboundary harm and that
the actor is one for whose activities the nation is
accountable). The Commission's current approach is to
limit international liability to physical activities
giving rise to physical transboundary harm. More specifically, the activity or situation giving rise to the
harm must have a physical effect and a physical
quality, and the effect must flow from that quality via
a "physical linkage," i.e., natural physical media such
as atmosphere, water, or earth, rather than economic,
political, international-trade, or cultural media.
Because the Commission's deliberations carry
little, if any, legal weight standing alone and
because, in any event, those deliberations are still in
process and substantial questions remain unanswered,
the rules just discussed do not offer concrete
assistance at present with respect to international
threats to national parks. Nevertheless, they offer
some promise for the future.
As indicated above, some commentators take the
view that, quite apart from the Commission's deliberations, international environmental law of an enforceable nature already exists, based on the state practice
alluded to earlier in this part. I am skeptical that
any general customary environmental law exists, but I
believe that a nation is not entirely free under customary law to pollute as it wishes without considering
-30-

the interests of other nations. Phrased differently,
there are general international-law principles (e.g.,
sic utere . . . , supra) that place restrictions on
behavior by nations, and those principles encompass,
inter alia, behavior affecting the environment. See
Brownlie, A Survey of International Customary Rules
of Environmental Protection, 13 Nat. Res. J. 179, 191
(1973); Johnston & Finkle, Acid Precipitation in North
America: The Case for Transboundary Cooperation, 14
Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 787, 818-19 (1981).

It is use-

ful in examining that question to consider the Trail
Smelter case, supra. That case involved transboundary
pollution from an iron ore smelter in British Columbia
that caused damage to private property in the State of
Washington. Canada and the United States agreed to
submit the dispute to arbitration. The tribunal
stated:
[U]nder the principles of international law, as
well as of the law of the United States, no state
has the right to use or permit the use of its
territory in such a manner as to cause injury by
fumes in or to the territory of another or the
properties or persons therein, when the case is of
serious consequence and the injury is established
by clear and convincing evidence.
The arbitral tribunal, inter alia, imposed a regulatory regime on Canada with respect to the smelter and
held, significantly, that even after complying with
those regulatory controls, Canada would still be liable
to make reparations to the United States if any harm
occurred -- i.e., Canada would have to make reparations
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for harm arising from wholly lawful activity.
No other tribunal, to my knowledge, has applied
such a rule to a transboundary-pollution question
(possibly because very few such disputes have been submitted to arbitration or to adjudication). But, in a
case involving the destruction of two British warships
by mines placed in Albanian waters, the ICJ held that a
nation was obliged "not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of
other States." See also Las Lanoux award, supra. A
significant embracing of the Trail Smelter rationale is
found in Principle 21 of the nonbinding Stockholm
Declaration, supra, which reads as follows:
States have, in accordance with the Charter
of the United Nations and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their
own resources pursuant to their own environmental
policies, and the responsibility to insure that
activities within their jurisdiction or control do
not cause damage to the environment of other
States or of areas beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction.

75

3. The law of the non-navigational uses of
international water courses
A number of commentators have concluded that there

exists a norm of general customary international law to
the effect that a riparian (or basin) nation has an
obligation to consult and negotiate in good faith with
other riparian (or basin) nations if that nation proposes to affect an international watercourse (e.a., a
river flowing between two nations) in a manner that
might cause serious injury to those other nations.
-32-

See, e.2., Bourne, Procedure in the Development of
International Drainage Basins: The Duty to Consult and
to Negotiate, 1972 Can. 4.3. Int'l L. 212, 233. For an
excellent discussion of that and related literature,
see F. Kirgis, Jr., supra, at 17-87. Such a duty,
assuming it exists, would provide some protection
against international threats involving watercourses,
but that duty might not prevent the threat from
occurring or make that occurrence unlawful, if the duty
of prior consultation and negotiation was complied
with.
The Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of
International Rivers, International Law Ass'n (1966)
reprinted in J. Barros & D. Johnston, supra, at 77-82,
drafted by the private International Law Association in
1966, are regarded by some commentators as a comprehensive statement of the international law of rivers. See
G. Wetstone & A. Rosencranz, Acid Rain in Europe and
North America: National Responses to an International
Problem 157 (1983). Article X of the Helsinki Rules
provides that no nation has the right to pollute an
international drainage basin so as to cause
"substantial injury" to a co-basin nation. If that
proposition is law, it may be useful in protecting
against international threats involving water pollution.
The International Law Commission is presently
studying the non-navigational uses of international
-33-

water courses, and its deliberations may be useful in
the future. The Commission has approached this topic
in a manner similar to the Commission's approach to
international liability, described above: both are
based on the potentially conflicting rights of
sovereigns to be free to engage in activities in their
own territory and still be free from interference from
other states; both include duties to negotiate and to
notify and inform; both encourage the formation of conventional regimes to deal with specific situations;
both prescribe a balancing test that is not welldefined; and both entail international accountability
for failure to fulfill their respective obligations.
The prospects for progress in this area, however, are
dimmed by the fact that the issue is extremely political due to the conflicting, and to some degree irreconcilable, interests of upstream and downstream nations.
D. Regional Customary International Law
1. United States - Canada
As indicated above, the United States and Canada
have a long tradition of cooperation with respect to
boundary and environmental issues. It is possible that
those activities have created a norm of regional customary international law regarding transboundary pollution or the environment more generally. If such a norm
does exist -- and I emphasize that my thinking on this
topic is especially embryonic -- it seems likely that
the norm would provide protection against pollution to
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some degree and thus might be helpful with respect to
protecting national parks against international
threats emanating from Canada.
The behavior of the two nations on which such a
regional norm might be based include: the 1909
Boundary Waters Treaty; the IJC investigations and
responses thereto; cooperation regarding the
Waterton-Glacier International Peace Park in the 1930s
and the biosphere-reserve activities more recently;
cooperation regarding various other national parks or
similar areas (e.g., Roosevelt Campobello International
Park and San Juan Island Historical Park); the 1972 and
1978 Great Lakes Agreements; a 1980 Memorandum of
Intent Between the Government of Canada and the
Government of the United States Concerning
Transboundary Air Pollution, Aug. 5, 1980, Canada-United States, U.S. Dept. State Bull., No. 2043 at 21
(Oct. 1980); the 1986 discussions between the two
nations about cooperating on an acid-rain study; and a
common legal tradition with respect to issues such as
nuisance, see McCaffrey, Private Remedies for
Transfrontier Pollution Damage in Canada and the United
States: A Comparative Survey, 19 W. Ont. L. Rev. 35
(1981). In this respect, it is interesting that in the
Gulf of Maine case (concerning the maritime boundary
between the two nations in the Gulf of Maine area), the
panel of the International Court of Justice based its
reasoning in part on the long tradition of cooperation
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between the two nations. For a discussion of resource
issues between those nations, see V.5.-Canada
Transboundary Resource Issues, 26 Nat. Res. J. 201-376

(1986).
2. United States - Mexico
One might also attempt to identify a norm of
regional customary international law regarding pollution between the United States and Mexico. Relevant
behavior by the nations in this respect would include:
the 1944 Water Treaty; the activities of the IBWC and
responses thereto; the ongoing dispute about the
quality of the Colorado River; the 1983 Environmental
Treaty and the 1985 Nacozari Agreement; and the fact
that the Douglas Smelter in the United States has been
polluting into Mexico for many years with no compensation or amelioration by the United States. The fact
that Mexico is a less developed country might also
affect the contents of any regional norm. See Magraw,
supra, 26 Wash. L. Rev.

(1986). As with the

possibility that there exists a regional norm between
the United States and Canada, my research here is at a
very early stage. At this point, I am not optimistic
that, if a regional norm between the United States and
Mexico exists regarding transboundary pollution, the
contents of that norm would provide much protection to
national parks against international threats.
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IV. DOMESTIC THREATS
I have encountered no evidence of customary international law that would require the United States to
protect national parks against domestic threats. With
respect to international agreements, the United
States-Canada boundary agreements and the United
StatesMexico Environmental Agreement possibly could
provide a basis for requiring the United States to protect a national park from a domestic threat if the
existence of that threat also caused the United States
to be in violation of either of those international
agreements. The protection of the national park would
thus be indirect, in a sense.
If any park-specific agreements exist, as is
hypothesized above in Part III.A.2.a., they may either
require the United States to protect a particular
national park directly or provide protection indirectly
via the possibility described in the immediately preceding paragraph. Similarly, if the United States is
required by a treaty such as a migratory bird or
wildlife treaty to protect the breeding grounds or
other habitat of a particular species and such breeding
ground or habitat is in a national park, international
law could be relevant. Again, my research is in its
extreme infancy in this regard.
The World Heritage Convention, supra, obligates
the nation in which natural or cultural heritage is
located to engage in some activities, although the
-37-

strength of that obligation is uncertain. Article 4,
for example, states that each party to the Convention
"recognizes that the duty of insuring the identification, protection, conservation, presentation and
transmission to future generations of the cultural and
natural heritage referred to in Articles 1 and 2 and
situated on its territory, belongs primarily to that
State. It will do all it can to this end, to the
utmost of its own resources and, where appropriate,
with any international assistance and cooperation . . . ." The inclusion of the word "duty" is
reassuring; the qualification implied by the terms "do
all it can," "to the utmost of its own resources," and
"where appropriate," reduce the strength of that obligation considerably.
Similarly, Article 5 provides that each party to
the Convention "shall endeavour, insofar as possible,
and as appropriate for each country" to take a number
of enumerated measures, including "to take the
appropriate legal, scientific, technical, administrative and financial measures necessary for the identification, protection, conservation, presentation and
rehabilitation of [the cultural and natural heritage
situated on its territory]." It is not obvious that
the promise to "endeavour, insofar as possible, and as
appropriate" entails any real obligation. The judges
in the Tasmania case, supra, disagreed on that issue.
A 1981 Department of Interior legal memorandum
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(summarizing an earlier memorandum) states that "the
Convention itself was executory; it established a
general good faith responsibility for each signatory to
protect heritage properties, but left latitude for
implementation to each country." (The 1981 memorandum
goes on to opine that 16 U.S.C. S 470a-1 "implements
these provisions . . . and [restricts] that latitude"
such that "the Secretary [of Interior] must be
satisfied that each nominated site has adequate legal
protection to ensure its preservation.")

There does

not appear to be a definitive answer at present.
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